issue for them to address is whether or not the elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt or not. If there are aggravating factors that exist in a second-degree homicide case, it's appropriate for the court to do an upward departure regardless of whether or not the jury acquitted on other charges. If defendant's position is true, the state could never ask for an upward departure in cases where juries convict in lesser-included offenses. And there are countless cases — and I'm not going to spend a lot more time on that, Your Honor — where courts have done upward departures even though juries have convicted only on lesser-included offenses.

Your Honor, if one had to choose the manner one had to die, one would not choose to be beaten to death. It's not a gentle way to die. It's not a pleasant way to die, and no one should have to endure that manner of death. MacKenzie's last minutes on earth were full of horror, brutality, and ugliness. And here on this sunny Friday afternoon in this antiseptic and well-lit courtroom, I cannot convey what she surely must have felt when this 150-pound man inflicted multiple blows on her, this 37-pound, three-year-old girl. I can't force people to smell the vomit or taste the blood from the cut lip or

feel the pain of two tears to the hymen, or surely the pain from the abrasions that were on her chest and face and stomach. And I can't recreate because words are ineffective and inadequate vessels to convey what her last moments had to have been like.

The purpose of the sentence, as Your Honor knows, is to reflect justice. It's to reflect the law. Your Honor. It's clear that society -- what we call society -- is not possible without a moral order, and a remorseful person owns up to what they have done, and they accept consequences of their actions.

The law states, Your Honor, that we are all personally responsible for our actions. We are all morally accountable for our actions. And Brian Merkt is responsible for his actions, and he's tried to escape his moral responsibility. He lied to the police about what happened. He lied on the witness stand about what happened. And it's clear the jury concluded that, Your Honor, because they convicted him of murder. They clearly had to have concluded that he has lied about what happened.

Your Honor, the purpose of sentencing can be rehabilitation, deterrence or incapacitation. We are asking for this 40-year sentence not for any of those purposes because I do not believe a prison sentence will

rehabilitate, deter or even ultimately incapacitate

Mr. Merkt because he'll be released again. But a

sentence can serve the function of telling the community

that what a defendant did is wrong, that what a defendant

did is not acceptable behavior in the community, that

what a defendant did is morally condemnable. And, Your

condemnable, then I do not know what is not.

We have charges of homicide because our law is based on the premise that every human being is of value and every murder is a violation of the spiritual kinship between every human being, and it's an affront to the fundamental good of the community and to the dignity of each member of the community. Human life should be considered invaluable. Human life is sacred, Your Honor, and we ask you to sentence defendant to the statutory maximum sentence because the defendant murdered MacKenzie Bussiere in her own home, in a place that should have been a sanctuary for her, a sanctuary of life, a sanctuary with her family, and we ask to you sentence him that way because it's a truly just and appropriate sentence given the facts in this case. Thank you.

Honor, if murdering a three-year-old girl is not morally

THE COURT: Thank you Mr. Harbinson.

We turn to the defense at this point. Mr.

Gray?

MR. GRAY: Your Honor, may it please the court, the beginning of Mr. Harbinson's argument reminding the court that you have discretion and it won't reversed except for the abuse of discretion seems to ask this court -- as I suspected from the get-go when I read his memorandum asking for an upward departure -- was to ask for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in this case.

There's not one case in Minnesota that says that you can rely on facts that my client was acquitted The fact is the jury -- and who of to upward depart. knows what the jury was thinking? Mr. Harbinson likes to inject some conjecture as to what they were thinking, but the fact is that the jury found my client guilty of an unintentional murder while committing a felony. under our law, which the court is sworn up to hold, the Sentencing Guidelines Commission has determined 150-month month sentence. That's their decision. That's unless there's some significant and compelling reasons to depart, and I've cited all the cases, and I don't --I'll just tell you once. I'm not going to go into all that. However, it seems to me, Your Honor, this is a classic case of a 150-month sentence on second-degree murder where he caused the death of -- he was convicted of causing the death of an individual while committing a felony, and our law, which the court has to follow, says

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that if the felony is part -- if the underlying conduct, the vulnerability, is a felony that was relied upon by the state or by the -- in convicting my client, they can't rely on that to depart. Otherwise, if he was convicted of manslaughter -- and you cite the Stumm case, which is a manslaughter case, where the fellow was only looking at two years and the judge departed to six -- this would be a manslaughter case because there wasn't the underlying felony. There were no broken bones in this case, Judge.

What the court instructed the jury in a recent law, very recent law in Minnesota that if you receive bruises above your -- about your face and neck -- that's a felony for somebody under four. And there's no question that after this jury was out for a while -- I read your instruction, I'm sure, more than one time -- that that's what they relied on in convicting him.

Therefore, Your Honor, with respect to the vulnerability of the victim, that's an element of this crime and relying on age, and if they did not have that statute, he wouldn't even be convicted. He'd be acquitted.

There are no substantial and compelling reasons in this case, Your Honor, when you take away the counts that he was acquitted of. The jury -- you talk about

this torn hymen. The jury did not find him guilty of tearing that hymen in a sexual manner, and Mr. Harbinson says it could have been in some other manner. He seems to forget that he argued and the court instructed if it was done in a sexual manner or aggressive manner under sexual contact that he would be responsible, and they rejected that. My client has no prior record. He did not intentionally murder this child.

As far as the particular cruelty, I just remind the court of the 911 call and what he was doing during that call of trying to revive MacKenzie.

The idea -- just to comment on a couple other things. Mr. Harbinson argues that MacKenzie was conscious. Well -- and that he should have got medical attention right away. Well, the evidence in this case from all of these doctors said that as soon as the blow to the head was received, however it was received, she was dead; that that would have -- that was their big argument in this case, that that was such a severe blow, could not have been falling downstairs; that it killed her instantly, or if it didn't kill her instantly, that she was conscious for only seconds. And now he stands up and argues that she had a night of terror.

In any event, Your Honor, we have briefed everything with respect to the departure. I think by law

and by sentencing guidelines, there's absolutely no basis to depart in this case. The only possible basis would be the abuse of position and trust where the fact there that my client knew MacKenzie is a reason to depart, and he was held in trust. Well, I don't know if it's anymore serious to be convicted of unintentionally murdering someone you don't know than somebody you do know. doesn't appear to me to be an aggravating factor, and there are cases that seem to -- the ends justify the But if you follow the law here and the sentencing guidelines for an unintentional murder, it's a 150-month month sentence. I can see the state now. "Well, he didn't know her. She had no contact with him, and that's a reason to depart." What reason would that be to depart if the same reason is he knew her, and he was with her for an hour? It certainly is not a reason for a substantial departure. It's no reason for departure at all.

The other grounds, Your Honor, we have briefed. We dispute the fact you can take into consideration the impact on the members of the family. I read briefly this case that he cited and gave me here, and I don't think — apparently the judge — Your Honor — had that case. I don't think that stands for anything different than we put in our brief.

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With respect to the lack of remorse, does that mean that you are not allowed to defend yourself in a court of law in this state of Minnesota? That you are going to be departing upward if you have maintained your innocence? What about the person that is innocent? Does that mean that that person gets punished more because he's asserted his innocence and because of circumstances beyond his control which could well have been in this case -- and I'm not going to argue his innocence -- that he stands convicted? Well, all right, then punish him; but don't punish him because he says he didn't do it, because you know what? Maybe he didn't do it. reason to punish, Your Honor. And so you get a catch-22. Well, he lacks remorse. Well, who wouldn't lack remorse if he was innocent and stands to serve 150 months in prison? And the jury did not believe he intentionally murdered anybody that day. The jury believed that it was an unintentional murder. They have the burden to prove these aggravating circumstances, substantial and compelling reasons to depart, and they simply haven't, Your Honor, not when you take away the four counts that he was acquitted of -- the rapes and the murder one and even the pattern of abuse. found it wasn't a pattern of abuse. This was a one-time thing. So, just punish him for what he was convicted of,

Your Honor. I ask the court to sentence him to the guidelines sentence of 150 months on behalf of him and his family.

A couple of comments with respect to the probation officer's request for DNA and sex offender registration. We briefed that. We argue that statute simply doesn't apply. And one argument that wasn't put in the brief is that if in fact this does apply, then it's clearly a violation of due process, particularly in light of all of the trauma and havoc caused by this so-called registration. My client was acquitted of each and every sex crime in this case. He should not have to, when he is done being punished for this case, have to register as a sex offender when he was acquitted of it. We believe the statute doesn't apply to him, but if it does, it's clearly a violation of due process for making him do something that's something for a sex offender.

So, we would object to that.

With respect to the restitution, Your Honor, we briefed that. My client has no money. They want restitution for Nicole, but the interesting thing is — and this is not disputed — if you read the custody of Nicole, the transcript, she didn't start acting up like this until after she lost her mother. That's when she started acting up and that was a few months after. I

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think it was two or three months later after the death of MacKenzie. And she lost her mother because, as I remember the transcript of that custody hearing that I read, because the mother didn't show up one weekend to take her. She was out all night and didn't show up to meet the grandmother to have her, and the custody judge who heard that ordered custody to the grandmother. That's hardly a reason to punish my client by, and that's what they want. They want punishment here. My goodness, even the state, with all the money they have, put a ceiling on the victim's reparations of \$5,000. They seem to want to use this therapy. And the state, as I read this, they only allow somebody to be paid \$75 an hour, and Dr. Hewitt is \$110 an hour but oh, yes, my client was going to go to prison, who doesn't have a bean. seem to want him to be paying for Nicole's treatment. I'd ask Your Honor not to require him to make restitution. We filed the affidavit.

Hopefully, when he's finished being punished, he can still have a productive life, Your Honor. The punishment in this case is 150 months in prison which is not any small time. That's a lot of time in prison. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Gray. A few weeks ago, I notified the attorneys in this case that I

intended to depart upward in the sentencing, and I was considering that, and I asked them to submit to me their respective positions. They have supplied me with that.

MR. GRAY: Before you get there, I've talked to Mr. Merkt beforehand, and he would rely on what I say and doesn't wish to make a statement.

THE COURT: That's what I understood.

MR. GRAY: I thought I better put it on the record.

MR. HARBINSON: We wanted that on the record.

THE COURT: Mr. Merkt, you did not want to say anything at this point? Correct? That's what I thought was the case, but I didn't put that on the record. Thank you.

So, they did supply me with the information some of which they have highlighted here this morning during their verbal statements. What I want to do briefly is touch upon a number of topics very quickly and then we will go ahead with the formalization of the sentence.

And this is for Brian Merkt and for all of you who're present, the professional people that are regularly in court and familiar with some of these things, but I think you all need to understand something. The state of Minnesota has Sentencing

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Guidelines which were put together and starting off with a group of people and ranking all the crimes going from thefts all the way up through murders, serious crimes — rapes, kidnaps, all kind of serious matters.

They called upon, when they began developing these Sentencing Guidelines, people from all walks of life and everyone who's involved in the system, from police personnel, defense counsel, prosecutors, Department of Correction personnel, sociologists, psychologists, people from all walks of life -- lay people, normal citizens -- to develop what would be an appropriate kind of sentence for each specific crime. They held hearings, extensive hearings all over the People testified at those hearings for and against the proposals for these different kinds of sentences. And what was developed from that was an opportunity given then to the sentencing judge to depart if, in a sentencing judge's opinion, the guideline sentence was not appropriate, and what they said is there have to be substantial and compelling reasons why that judge should go up or down: Either that there were aggravating circumstances in the crime which would suggest an upward departure; mitigating circumstances in the crime which would suggest a downward departure. example, someone could be accused of theft and convicted

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of theft and perhaps that person was without a job and was stealing to provide food for his family. It's a mitigating circumstance which would probably allow the court to depart downward rather than the guidelines sentence.

Anyway, these guidelines were put together and the judges in this state must follow the guidelines, and it's to provide for uniformity so that people convicted of the same crime are not treated differently in different parts of the state and in front of the different judges.

So, in this particular case, there is a statute that says people convicted of the crime of murder in the second degree can be sentenced up to 40 years in prison. Sentencing Guidelines call for 150 months, which is 12 and a half years in prison. I suppose the outside time that ever would be allowed would be the 40 years in this kind of a situation. The guidelines, however, call for 12 and a half years. And unless the court can spell out with specificity particular reasons as to why that guideline should be changed, the sentence to be imposed should be 150 months, and that's it. And that is again to provide for uniformity and people are not treated differently.

Now, for reasons that I'm going to tell now, I

am going to depart, and I am going to depart upward on the guidelines. This particular case involves several reasons for wanting to depart upward from the guidelines which I believe are substantial and compelling and aggravating circumstances.

Number one is the vulnerability of the victim, MacKenzie, due to her age. We all heard the testimony. We all know about her being a three-year-old. And wasn't much question she was a very vulnerable person -- little girl, 47 pounds, small person, vulnerable.

Second compelling and substantial reason for an upward departure is that the particular cruelty of the offense, and I am looking at specifically three separate categories under that. Number one, and the very obvious one again, testimony which was heard by all of us who were here was the extensive bruising and the injuries to the victim. I don't think I need to say much more than that. We saw the pictures. We heard the testimony. We heard from numerous physicians and medical personnel about the nature, the extent, the duration of those injuries and how horrible they were.

As part of that particular cruelty, there's a second item, and that is leaving the victim in an injured state without calling medical personnel. The jury accepted that testimony. That is what the defendant has

been convicted of, and that is what the court has to deal with.

Thirdly, as part of that same cruelty incident is the impact that that had, that whole incident had on the victim's sister, Nicole, causing her some severe psychological trauma as a result. That definitely is something we heard a lot about during the course of this trial, and the timing is not simply coincidental with having been removed from her mother's custody. It's something from what I heard at least in my recall of the testimony that was directly related to what happened to MacKenzie. So, that's a second category of particular cruelty of the offense which would suggest an upward departure.

And finally there's a third category, and that is that the offender's position of authority and trust over the victim was violated. He was left to care for her while her mother went shopping. One would have expected nothing like what occurred, and he violated that trust. He violated the competence. He violated his authority. Twenty-three-year old man, a three-year-old girl. And the jury found that he murdered her.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, that's what we have to deal with. We deal with what the jury found. The jury did not find that there was any sexual criminal

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They did not find that, and the case law which has been submitted by both counsel suggests pretty strongly to me that what the court needs to do is look at what the jury found. I cannot impose my own beliefs and my own findings. I'm not the jury. I take the jury's finding, which was second-degree murder, and I impose a sentence based upon that and that alone, and I have to neglect and forget and not deal with any alleged criminal sexual conduct because that was simply alleged. It was not proven to the satisfaction of that jury beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore, the defendant was acquitted, and the judge cannot now take that same information for which the person has been acquitted and, in effect, turn it against them again and say, "Even though you were acquitted, we are still going to use this against you in your sentencing." So can't do that, and I think you all have to understand that. What we are dealing with as a matter of law is what the jury found. They were fact finders, and the jury did find second-degree murder. And for the reasons that I have suggested, I believe that the 12-and-a-half year sentence or 150 months is not an appropriate sentence.

Before I go ahead with that sentence, three or four other things very quickly that I'll address. There have been requests for restitution. I'm going to order

some restitution, but it's going to be based upon the findings of the Minnesota Crime Victim's Reparation Board. If there's any other request for restitution, that will have to be addressed to that organization. Again, both counsel — or all counsel, I should say — have briefed this issue to the court, and I have also received copies from Ms. Vilcins from the Department of Corrections and from some of you individually with respect to your restitution. And those matters should be addressed to that Crime Victim Reparation Board.

When you look at restitution, there's a reason for it. It's not just to make the people whole again because you really cannot be made whole again, and not all of your expenses incurred are going to be reimbursable. Some things are kind elective. In other words, if you choose to take time off of work because of the trial or because of things you need to do and so on, those aren't necessarily expenses that will be reimbursed. Out of pocket, where you pay somebody else for psychological counseling or whatever, some of those can be reimbursed but I'm going to have delegated to the Department of Corrections and the crime reparation board the need to take care of those things.

It's been pointed out that the defendant is going to be in prison really, not in much of a position

to pay a lot of money out. That's true. I asked this morning if anyone was aware of what they are getting paid in prison when they work in prison industries and no one is quite sure what that amount is that I talked with, but it's something below the minimum wage but it's not twenty cents an hour. Probably more in the neighborhood of four or five dollars an hour at least. And unlike some people that are paid the minimum wage, the defendant in this case is going to get his housing, his food, his recreation, his medical, his dental, and anything else he needs. So that money is there. It can be used, and it should be used to pay the restitution.

The other item that was discussed dealt with whether or not a defendant should be required to give a sample for DNA purposes and whether or not the defendant should be required to register under a sex offender statute. Again, I'm bound by the law as it exists today. The law says that whenever a person, even if acquitted, has been charged with a criminal sexual conduct charge, but arising from that same set of circumstance he's convicted of something else, that he must register and he must have a DNA sample provided. So that's going to be required of you. I frankly don't know how constitutional that law is. The problem is it hasn't been at this point challenged, as it may well be in this

case. But unless and until the constitutionality is changed and that law is overturned, I'm bound to follow it. So I'm going to require that at this point. There is some requirement of assessment and surcharge fees and really it doesn't amount to a whole lot of money, and there's a minimum of \$20 for an assessment and \$25 for surcharge, and that would be ordered by the court.

The final thing that's been discussed here is whether or not there should be any contact by the defendant with Nicole, and she does not wish to have that contact, and that will be a condition: That there not be contact with Nicole unless she voluntarily wishes to have that contact.

both counsel have pointed out that we are here to do some justice, that the judge must try to look at the entire situation and provide for some justice. It's a very delicate balancing situation we look at. We look at the victim, or victims. We look at the general underlying concern of the public, not concern as far as I'm concerned as far as popularity goes or anything with the press or any of that kind of thing, but I'm talking about the need of the public to have some rationale for what's being done in these court systems. And in justice, there's a thing called retribution and because we do it in court manner, we don't take people out and

shoot them and hang them in the public square and those kinds of things. We try to do it in the American manner, proper manner unlike what's done in many places in the world.

There's always concern for the victim -excuse me -- for the defendant. The defendant, the
possibility of rehabilitation and all those things, much
of which have been discussed by counsel in their
respective briefs, and I think to some extent verbally
here today. So, we look at all of these things in trying
to come up with a sentence that makes some sense and
again, that sentence isn't exactly what the judge might
do given his or her "druthers" because there are these
strict provisions that we need to follow, and I think
I've commented enough on those, and I'm not going to get
into it any further.

At this point I'm going to ask you to stand, Mr. Merkt, and we are going to proceed with the formal sentence.

You, Brian Patrick Merkt, having been convicted of murder in the second degree, it's the sentence of this court and the judgment of this court that as a punishment, you are hereby committed to the Commissioner of Corrections for a period of 300 months, a period double the presumptive sentence under the Minnesota

Sentencing Guidelines. You shall be given credit for time you have already served in this matter. Further under state law you will serve two-third's of that total executed sentence in prison and the maximum supervised release term equal to the remaining one-third. The Commissioner may extend your term of imprisonment up to the entire sentence if you do violate any disciplinary rules while in prison or violate any conditions of supervised release.

In addition to that sentence, you will be required to make restitution in the amount of \$4,582.50 to the Minnesota Crime Victim Reparation Board for the medical or mental health expense already incurred by the victim's family as a result of the defendant's criminal behavior, and the Department of Corrections will work a payment schedule out with you to have that paid from any earnings you have while you are in prison.

You will be required to provide a DNA sample and also to register as a convicted offender under Minnesota Statute 243.166. You will be required to pay the \$20 assessment fee, \$25 surcharge, and insofar as out-of-pocket costs are concerned for Nicole's continued therapy, I'm going to have those addressed to the Minnesota Crime Victim Reparation Board again. And if they have examined that and make a determination that

there's some additional amount to be paid, it should be paid. I'm concerned at this point about projected costs that can go on forever, and I don't think it's appropriate for me to use that kind of conjecture here to require payment and give someone basically a blank check here. So, we will leave it to them to make the determination as to the appropriate amount. If there is any person who's aggrieved by that, there's — there are hearing processes that can be followed after the crime board has made its decision.

Is there anything further the state wants to address at this point?

MR. HARBINSON: I don't know if you've mentioned the condition of no contact with Nicole, Your Honor. We would ask that to be --.

THE COURT: I did indicate earlier, but I'll say it again: That given the family and Nicole's preference, there should be no contact with Nicole.

Mr. Gray?

MR. GRAY: I have nothing.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. HARBINSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: We stand adjourned.

(The proceedings were adjourned.)

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1	STATE OF MINNESOTA )
2	) REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
3	COUNTY OF SCOTT )
4	I, Barbara B. Bennett, a stenographic reporter
5	of, do hereby certify the foregoing 45 pages of material
6	constitute a true, accurate, and complete transcription of the
7	record taken by me at the date and place hereinbefore
8	mentioned to the best of my ability.
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11	Barbara B. Bennett
12	Darbara b. Dennecc
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16	Dated this 13th day of May, 1997.
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